Part 1 of this series argued that markets are old and that a market society is new. A market society is the arrangement in which price alone settles the allocation of land and labor (Part 1). That post left a question open. Someone built the first market society in a particular place, and to build it took land, labor, and money on a very large scale.

Europe built its market society while it ran an empire. The sugar, the cotton, the silver, and much of the labor came from other continents. This post also asks a second question. Did the relation end when the colonies became independent?

Three terms do the work in this post. I use drain for the net transfer of resources and labor from the South to the North. I use unequal exchange for the method that measures the drain. I use extractive relation for the structure that produces the drain. The word “drain” comes from a nineteenth-century Indian argument about British rule, and researchers use it again now.

Three claims, and which one matters most

This post makes three claims of different types.

1. Colonialism supplied a material contribution to European industrial capitalism that was large enough to matter.
2. The extractive relation between the North and the South outlives formal decolonization.
3. That relation is measurable in the present.

Claim 2 is the central claim. Claims 1 and 3 support it. Serious scholars contest all three, and I place the objections next to the evidence.

Sugar, slavery, and the first industrial economy

Sidney Mintz was an anthropologist, and he made the connection concrete. Sweetness and Power follows sugar from Caribbean slave plantations to the tea tables of the English working class (Mintz, 1985). Sugar started as a luxury for aristocrats. It became a cheap source of calories for factory workers. It arrived with tea and jam in the diet of an industrial labor force.

Mintz makes two arguments. The plantation was an early form of the factory, because it combined discipline, time control, and a divided labor process on a large scale. The plantation also supplied a large share of the cheap calories in the industrial diet. Slavery in the Caribbean and wage labor in Lancashire belonged to one system.

Eric Williams made the harder economic version of this argument first. Williams was a historian, and he later became the first Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago. Capitalism and Slavery argued that slave trade and plantation profits financed British industrialization. It also argued that Britain abolished slavery when slavery stopped paying (Williams, 1944/2021). The third edition carries a foreword by the economist William Darity Jr. and an introduction by the historian Colin Palmer.

The strongest objections to the Williams thesis

Economic historians attacked Williams for fifty years. Their objections come in two forms, and both deserve a full statement.

The first form disputes the arithmetic. Stanley Engerman was an economic historian, and he built the numbers. He estimated that slave trade profits supplied between 2.4 percent and 10.8 percent of British capital formation for the period 1688 to 1770. He put the contribution to British national income at 0.5 percent or less (Engerman, 1972).

Patrick O’Brien, also an economic historian, widened the test to all trade with the periphery. He put the total profits from that trade in 1784 to 1786 at about £5.66 million. He concluded that “for the economic growth of the core the periphery was peripheral” (O’Brien, 1982).

The second form is stronger, because it explains British industrialization without the empire. Robert Allen is an economic historian, and he argues that British wages were high while British coal was cheap. That price structure made labor-saving machines profitable to invent in Britain and unprofitable elsewhere (Allen, 2009). The structural counterexample supports the same conclusion.

Switzerland, Sweden, and Belgium industrialized early without large empires. Spain and Portugal held large empires for centuries without industrializing first. Empire was therefore neither necessary nor enough by itself.

Two recent bodies of work answer those objections. Joseph Inikori is an economic historian, and he changed the argument from slave trade profits to markets, shipping, insurance, and finance. He argued that Africa and the slave economies of the Americas were the main markets for English manufactured goods. He also argued that the trade in slave-produced commodities created the shipping and financial services of the period (Inikori, 2002). Maxine Berg and Pat Hudson are economic historians. They extended that argument with new evidence on how far slavery reached into the British domestic economy (Berg & Hudson, 2023).

One study attaches a number to the broader claim. Stephan Heblich, Stephen Redding, and Hans-Joachim Voth used slaveholder compensation records and weather-induced mortality shocks on the middle passage as a source of variation. They estimate that slavery wealth raised aggregate British income by about the equivalent of a decade of growth. They also estimate that it raised local income in the most involved places by more than 40 percent (Heblich, Redding, & Voth, 2022). Their paper is a working paper, and the estimate is one result. Specialists do not agree on it.

Here is what survives. The narrow claim about financing fails, and the arithmetic defeats it. Allen’s high-wage account is the strongest rival, and it still gives Atlantic trade a role in the urbanization that produced British high wages. Claim 1 therefore holds in a limited form.

Colonial markets, colonial commodities, and colonial finance changed the composition of British industry. One credible estimate puts the aggregate effect at about a decade of growth. Specialists still argue about the size.

Wolf: one interconnected world

Eric Wolf was an anthropologist, and he corrected a common error. Europe and the People Without History attacked the image of colonized societies as isolated, static, and without contact. Wolf showed them as active participants in one interconnected world economy. He traced how the fur trade, the slave trade, and the plantation system reorganized whole regions (Wolf, 1982).

The correction matters for this post. If the colonized world was static and separate, then European growth and colonial poverty were two separate stories. Wolf shows one story with many parts. The Iroquois, the Ashanti, and the Bengali weaver each held a position in a single system. Their positions changed as the system changed.

Underdevelopment as a produced relation

Walter Rodney was a historian from Guyana, and he extended the argument. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa argued that African poverty is a product of the relation with Europe (Rodney, 1972/2018). The Verso reissue carries a foreword by Angela Y. Davis. Rodney treats development and underdevelopment as two results of one process.

That is a causal claim, and a large quantitative literature now tests it. Nathan Nunn is an economist, and he measured the effect region by region. He used shipping records to estimate slave exports by area. He used distance to the demand centers of the slave trades as an instrument. He found that the areas which lost the most people to the slave trades are the poorest in Africa today (Nunn, 2008).

Melissa Dell is an economist, and she used a regression discontinuity at the boundary of the Peruvian mining mita. She found that the mita lowers household consumption by about 25 percent in the districts it covered. She traced the channels through land tenure and public goods (Dell, 2010).

Those two studies also carry a limit that I should apply to myself. They cover one continent and one country. I use them to anchor a claim about the whole North-South relation. Austin’s charge about the compression of history applies to that move as well as to Rodney’s.

Those results support Rodney in part, and they stop short of his full claim. Both studies identify effects across regions inside one continent or one country. Neither supplies the absolute counterfactual level of African income without the slave trade and colonial rule. That absolute level is what Rodney asserts. The relative result is solid. The absolute claim remains a hypothesis.

Gareth Austin is an economic historian, and he names the danger in long causal arguments. He calls it the compression of history. A long causal story can collapse four centuries into a single mechanism. It can then attribute a present outcome to a distant cause without tracing the steps between (Austin, 2008). Austin aims that criticism at the reversal-of-fortune literature of Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2002). It applies to Rodney with equal force.

Coloniality: the theory of persistence

Aníbal Quijano was a Peruvian sociologist. Anthropologists cite him constantly, so the discipline label matters. His concept is the coloniality of power (Quijano, 2000). The argument has two parts. Racial classification and capitalist labor control appeared together in the Americas. Formal colonial rule then ended, and the classification survived inside global labor markets, inside states, and inside knowledge production.

Quijano asserts that neither element produced the other. He asserts the co-emergence instead of showing it.

The concept does useful work. It explains why the end of empire did not end the pattern of who does which work at which price. It also carries a risk.

Frederick Cooper is a historian of Africa, and he wrote the sharpest published objection to this style of argument. He criticizes work that gives “explanatory worth to agentless abstractions” such as coloniality and modernity. He lists four failure modes: story plucking, leapfrogging legacies, doing history backward, and the epochal fallacy (Cooper, 2005). Cooper targets that discourse broadly, and I read leapfrogging legacies as the charge that lands on Quijano. It names the move that jumps from a colonial origin to a present outcome without the history between them.

I accept the objection, and this post does not meet the standard it sets. Ethnography supplies a mechanism at one site and cannot aggregate it. The trade data supply a magnitude only. Neither one supplies the period-by-period institutional history that Cooper demands. The Nunn and Dell studies come closest, because both trace channels, and both cover a narrower question than coloniality does.

What the drain looks like at the site

Anthropology has an advantage here. It can go to the mine, the oil field, and the plantation. It can record what the relation does to the people inside it. Jerry Jacka is an anthropologist, and his review article is the best single entry point to this work (Jacka, 2018).

Each study below covers one site and one relation.

• June Nash was an anthropologist, and she lived in a Bolivian tin mining town. We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us records the physical cost of tin production and the ritual life that miners built around it (Nash, 1979). The title comes from the miners, and it states the exchange in their own terms.
• Michael Taussig is an anthropologist, and he examined the devil in the folklore of Colombian plantation workers and Bolivian tin miners. He read the devil pact as a critique that workers make of wage labor itself (Taussig, 1980).
• Fernando Coronil was an anthropologist and historian, and he studied the Venezuelan petrostate. The Magical State shows how oil money let successive presidents appear as figures who could transform the nation. The appearance depended on a commodity that the state did not make (Coronil, 1997).
• Suzana Sawyer is an anthropologist, and she followed the conflict between a United States oil company, the Ecuadorian state, and an indigenous movement. Crude Chronicles shows that neoliberal reform and indigenous organization produced each other in the same decade (Sawyer, 2004).
• Stuart Kirsch is an anthropologist, and he spent more than two decades with the Yonggom people near the Ok Tedi mine in Papua New Guinea. The mine discharged more than two billion metric tons of tailings, overburden, and waste rock into the Fly River system. The pollution runs a thousand kilometers to the sea (Kirsch, 2014).

Kirsch adds a subject the older studies do not cover. He examines the relation between mining corporations and their critics. At this mine and across the industry network around it, he shows corporations that learn from each round of opposition.

In the cases Kirsch documents, a company answers a scientific finding with its own science. It answers a protest with a consultation process. It answers a lawsuit with a settlement that limits future claims. The next post in this series returns to the same practice on the subject of climate.

Anna Tsing is an anthropologist, and she supplies the concept for the space where this happens. She calls it the resource frontier. It is a zone where property rights are unsettled and where value appears to come from nature itself (Tsing, 2003). Friction develops the point with fieldwork in the Indonesian rainforest. It shows that global capital worked through local entrepreneurs, local violence, and local law (Tsing, 2005).

The drain, measured

Ethnography shows the mechanism at one site. It cannot show the size of the drain. One research programme tries to do that, and it supplies most of the evidence for claim 3.

Jason Hickel is an economic anthropologist, and he works with ecological economists on this problem. The method measures unequal exchange. The South exports more embodied resources and labor than it imports. It receives less money for them, because prices in the South are lower. The programme treats the price gap as a drain.

Every dollar total below depends on one contested step, and a later section states the objection to it. The three results below also come from one method run three ways. They share authors, they share the same multi-regional input-output data, and they share the step that values Southern exports at Northern prices. They are not three independent confirmations.

• Hickel, Dylan Sullivan, and Huzaifa Zoomkawala put the drain from South to North between 1960 and 2018 at $62 trillion in constant 2011 dollars. They put it at $152 trillion when they add the growth that the South lost (Hickel, Sullivan, & Zoomkawala, 2021).
• Hickel, Christian Dorninger, Hanspeter Wieland, and Intan Suwandi measured the physical flows. In 2015 the North took, net of what it sent back, four kinds of embodied flow from the South. The flows were 12 billion tons of raw material equivalents, 822 million hectares of land, 21 exajoules of energy, and 188 million person-years of labor. Those flows were worth $10.8 trillion in Northern prices. The cumulative drain from 1990 to 2015 came to $242 trillion in constant 2010 dollars. The loss to the South was more than 30 times its aid receipts (Hickel, Dorninger, Wieland, & Suwandi, 2022).
• Christian Dorninger, Alf Hornborg, and their coauthors measured the price gap directly. Value added per ton of raw material embodied in exports is 11 times higher in high-income countries than in the lowest-income countries. Per unit of embodied labor it is 28 times higher (Dorninger et al., 2021).

The dollar totals need one caution from inside the programme itself. The authors describe the step that converts embodied labor into dollars as a thought experiment. They warn that all monetary representations of value deserve caution.

Alf Hornborg is an anthropologist and a coauthor of the third study. He later argued that the physical flows are the real subject of unequal exchange. He holds that the money figures obscure them (Hornborg, 2025). The physical measurements are the more durable part of this work.

Utsa Patnaik is an economist, and she made the historical version of the estimate. She calculated the British drain from India between 1765 and 1938 at about £9.2 trillion, or about $45 trillion. Her method takes India’s export surplus earnings as the measure and applies compound interest at 5 percent (Patnaik, 2017). Jason Hickel wrote the popular summary (Hickel, 2018).

How reliable the numbers are

The Patnaik figure is her own estimate. Tirthankar Roy is an economic historian at the London School of Economics, and he raises two objections. Patnaik treats the export surplus as a one-way drain. Roy argues that much of it paid for shipping, insurance, and interest on capital invested in India.

Roy also shows that the land tax burden fell from about 10 percent of net output in the 1850s to about 5 percent by the 1930s. That fall is evidence against a drain that increased (Roy, 2019). Compound interest at 5 percent over 173 years also produces most of the total. A different rate produces a very different figure.

The sharpest objection to the unequal exchange numbers comes from Niall Reddy and Virgilio Urbina Lazardi. Both study sociology and political economy at New York University. Their paper is a preprint, and it is too new for a published response. I do not call it settled.

They argue that the drain estimates depend on premises of North-South parity in productivity and in export composition. Without those premises, they say, the method cannot produce a determinate fair-price vector. The headline totals are then ungrounded, which is a stronger problem than uncertainty (Reddy & Urbina Lazardi, 2026). I cannot dismiss the objection for its preprint status, because it targets the identifying assumption itself.

A second criticism came earlier from Peter Somerville, a social policy scholar, who argued that the theory is confused and internally inconsistent (Somerville, 2022). Hornborg published a reply in the same journal (Hornborg, 2022). Somerville and the Hornborg reply set out the disagreement in full.

A separate effort now covers some of the same ground. Gastón Nievas and Thomas Piketty are economists. They built a database of global trade flows and the world balance of payments. It covers 57 territories from 1800 to 2025.

They find that the core European powers ran a permanent current account surplus between 1800 and 1914. The rest of the world ran deficits in the same period. They quantify the role of colonial transfers and of low commodity prices in the increase in European foreign wealth. That wealth reached about 70 percent of European GDP by 1914 (Nievas & Piketty, 2025). Their work is a working paper.

Their evidence supports the colonial-era claim strongly. It complicates the present-day claim. They find that the main surpluses since the 1970s come from East Asia and from the oil producers of the Middle East and North Africa. They do not come from Europe. So I cannot call their work independent corroboration for claim 3. It corroborates claim 1 and it raises a problem for claim 2.

What the drain framework can and cannot do

The drain framework has the weakness that Part 1 named in Polanyi’s double movement. It can absorb any outcome after the event. A poor country stays poor, and the drain explains it. A poor country grows fast, and the drain explains what that country exports. A framework that fits every result predicts nothing.

Two tests would count against the argument of this post.

• The framework predicts that countries which move into high-value-added export positions should converge on Northern income. It predicts that countries locked into raw material export should not. If convergence and export composition turned out to be unrelated across countries, the mechanism would be wrong.
• If the measured physical flows reversed while Southern income stayed flat, the causal reading of the flows would fail. The physical measurement is the falsifiable part, because the dollar figures depend on the price assumption that Reddy and Urbina Lazardi attack.

One more possible test does not work. It would ask whether the price gap closes and the measured drain falls to zero. The measured drain is defined by the price gap, so the test uses the metric to test itself.

One case forces a revision now. China ended poverty for hundreds of millions of people inside the trade structure that this post calls extractive. It did so as an exporter. Nievas and Piketty record the same shift in the surplus positions. I therefore retire the unbounded version of claim 2. The evidence does not support the claim that the extractive relation prevents Southern development.

A bounded version survives, and it survives in two unequal halves. The physical half is solid. Unequal exchange moves large flows of materials, energy, land, and labor from South to North. Those flows are measured in tons, hectares, joules, and hours instead of dollars. The Reddy and Urbina Lazardi objection does not touch them, because it attacks the price step alone.

The monetary half is weaker. The claim that unequal exchange constrains the terms on which Southern countries integrate reads the price gap as a drain. That reading is the step they attack. I hold the physical claim and I hold the monetary claim provisionally. Neither half determines whether a given country grows.

China shows that a state can change its position inside the structure. It does not show that the structure is absent. The physical flows continued to increase through the period of Chinese growth.

The title of this post needs the same qualification. It names the physical flows, and those flows do continue. It does not name the stronger claim about arrested development, because that claim does not survive this section.

What comes next

Part 1 argued that a market society treats land, labor, and money as commodities that they are not. This post added the geography. The first market society commodified land and labor at home, and it commodified land and labor across an ocean at the same time.

The evidence supports a graded conclusion. Colonial markets and colonial commodities changed British industry. Specialists still argue about the size of that effect.

The physical flows from South to North are large, they are measured, and they continue. The dollar valuations of those flows rest on a contested assumption. The claim that this relation prevents Southern development does not survive the Chinese case. The narrower claim about constrained terms of integration does survive it.

The next post follows the last point into climate. It examines how the fossil fuel industry produced delay. It examines how shareholder value made that delay rational for the firms involved. It also examines what anthropology says about the manufacture of doubt.

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