When Authority Overrides Evidence: An Anthropological Analysis of Why People Believe Power Over Perception

Introduction

Recent incidents in the United States in which civilians were killed by federal law enforcement agents and subsequently labeled as violent threats or domestic terrorists, despite the existence of widely circulated video evidence suggesting otherwise, raise a critical applied anthropological question: Why do many people accept authoritative narratives even when those narratives appear to contradict observable reality?

Applied anthropology is concerned not only with understanding human behavior but also with examining how social systems produce harm, justify institutional practices, and shape everyday decision making. From this perspective, the problem is not simply whether individuals misinterpret evidence. Rather, it is how political authority, bureaucratic institutions, media environments, and social identities interact to structure what kinds of knowledge are treated as credible.

This article argues that belief in authority over direct evidence emerges from five interconnected social processes: (1) the social construction of legitimate authority, (2) bureaucratic obedience and routinization, (3) identity-based conformity and emotion, (4) epistemic bias embedded in political systems, and (5) social network dynamics that amplify dominant narratives. Using these frameworks, the paper applies established theory to contemporary U.S. cases to demonstrate how institutional power shapes public belief even in the presence of contradictory visual documentation.

Legitimate Authority as a Cultural Relationship

From an applied anthropological perspective, authority is best understood as a culturally maintained relationship rather than a simple exercise of force. Political institutions function because people collectively recognize their right to issue commands and define reality. Ladenson (1972) distinguishes between de facto authority, which refers to power that exists in practice, and legitimate authority, which refers to power that is believed to be morally justified. Importantly, legitimacy does not depend on whether authority behaves ethically, but on whether people believe its claims are valid.

Gentry (2014) further demonstrates that modern political systems routinely merge procedural authority, meaning the recognized right to act, with moral legitimacy, meaning the assumption that actions are ethically correct. This conflation produces epistemic bias, a structural tendency to grant state actors automatic credibility while treating nonstate actors as inherently suspicious. When government officials describe a civilian as a terrorist, many people accept that description not because of independent evaluation, but because cultural norms assign truth-producing power to the state.

For anthropologists working with communities affected by state violence, this insight is essential. Harmful outcomes are not produced only by individual prejudice. They are sustained by shared cultural expectations about who is entitled to define truth.

Bureaucratic Obedience and the Normalization of Harm

Milgram’s obedience research demonstrated that ordinary individuals often comply with authoritative commands even when those commands conflict with personal moral standards (Eckman, 1977). Participants experienced psychological distress yet continued to administer what they believed were painful electric shocks because the authority figure framed compliance as necessary and legitimate.

Brannigan and Perry (2016) situate Milgram’s findings within broader historical discussions of mass violence, emphasizing how bureaucratic systems create normative environments that suppress moral reflection. Individuals come to understand themselves primarily as role occupants rather than moral agents. Responsibility is displaced upward within the hierarchy.

Cunha, Rego, and Clegg (2010) extend this analysis through their examination of the Khmer Rouge, showing how extreme obedience was produced through total institutional control, ideological training, and social isolation. Obedience was not accidental. It was systematically cultivated.

Applied to contemporary law enforcement and immigration systems, these findings suggest that violent encounters are not merely the result of individual misconduct. They emerge from organizational cultures that prioritize rule enforcement, threat framing, and institutional loyalty. At the same time, members of the public who trust these institutions may assume that official statements reflect careful, objective assessments, even when video evidence suggests otherwise.

This highlights the importance of studying organizational cultures, training practices, and accountability structures, not only individual behavior.

Identity, Emotion, and Political Conformity

Belief formation is deeply social and emotional. Suhay (2015) demonstrates that people conform to political norms largely because group membership provides psychological rewards. Conformity generates pride and belonging, while deviation produces embarrassment and shame.

When political identities become linked to support for policing, border enforcement, or national security institutions, accepting official narratives becomes a way of affirming group membership. Questioning those narratives can feel like a betrayal of one’s social community.

From an applied standpoint, this means that presenting additional evidence alone is often insufficient to change beliefs. Information campaigns that ignore identity and emotion may fail because they do not address the underlying social stakes of belief.

Anthropologists working in public education, policy, or advocacy must therefore consider how messages interact with group identities rather than assuming purely rational evaluation.

The Spiral of Silence and Public Discourse

Noelle-Neumann’s (1977) spiral of silence theory explains how perceived majority opinion suppresses dissent. People who believe their views are unpopular often remain silent to avoid social isolation. Those who perceive their views as dominant speak more openly. Over time, this creates the appearance of consensus.

When government narratives are rapidly amplified through press conferences, official statements, and major media outlets, they quickly appear dominant. Individuals who interpret video evidence differently may self-censor, even if they privately disagree. Silence is then mistaken for agreement.

This process helps explain why communities may appear divided or apathetic even when substantial private doubt exists. Understanding this dynamic is critical for designing community-based forums where dissent can be expressed safely.

Social Networks and the Circulation of Belief

Zollman (2010) shows that conformity within social networks can sometimes increase reliability but can also entrench false beliefs, especially when information flows through highly centralized or authoritative nodes.

In contemporary digital environments, state institutions and major media organizations function as high-influence nodes. Their initial framing of events often reaches audiences before raw footage or independent analysis. Once a dominant interpretation circulates widely, later contradictory evidence faces structural resistance.

Studying digital cultures must therefore examine not only content but also network structure, platform algorithms, and amplification patterns.

Synthesis: An Applied Model

From an anthropological perspective, belief in authority over evidence is best understood as a system-level outcome:

Together, these forces make belief in official narratives socially reasonable, even when those narratives conflict with visual evidence.

Implications for Practice

For anthropologists engaged in policy, advocacy, journalism, or community work, several implications follow:

  1. Counter-narratives must address identity and emotion, not only facts.
  2. Institutional reform requires attention to training, incentives, and accountability structures.
  3. Safe spaces for dissent can weaken spiral-of-silence effects.
  4. Media literacy efforts should include analysis of power and framing, not only source evaluation.

Understanding these dynamics shifts focus from blaming individuals toward transforming the systems that shape belief.

Conclusion

Belief in authority over contradictory evidence is not a psychological anomaly. It is a predictable product of social systems that organize legitimacy, obedience, identity, discourse, and information flow. Applied anthropology provides tools for diagnosing these systems and for designing interventions that reduce harm, increase accountability, and expand whose knowledge is treated as credible.

References (APA)

Brannigan, A., & Perry, G. (2016). Milgram, genocide and bureaucracy: A post-Weberian perspective. State Crime Journal, 5(2), 287-305. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.13169/statecrime.5.2.0287

Cunha, M. P. e., Rego, A., & Clegg, S. R. (2010). Obedience and evil: From Milgram and Kampuchea to normal organizations. Journal of Business Ethics, 97(2), 291-309. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40929410

Eckman, B. K. (1977). Research: Stanley Milgram’s “obedience” studies. ETC: A Review of General Semantics, 34(1), 88-99. https://www.jstor.org/stable/42575230

Gentry, C. E. (2014). Epistemic bias: Legitimate authority and politically violent nonstate actors. In C. E. Gentry & A. E. Eckert (Eds.), The future of just war: New critical essays (pp. 17-35). University of Georgia Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46nbn3.4

Ladenson, R. F. (1972). Legitimate authority. American Philosophical Quarterly, 9(4), 335-341. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009461

Noelle-Neumann, E. (1977). Turbulences in the climate of opinion: Methodological applications of the spiral of silence theory. Public Opinion Quarterly, 41(2), 143-158. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2748333

Suhay, E. (2015). Explaining group influence: The role of identity and emotion in political conformity and polarization. Political Behavior, 37(1), 221-251. https://www.jstor.org/stable/43653424

Zollman, K. J. S. (2010). Social structure and the effects of conformity. Synthese, 172(3), 317-340. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40496044